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Abstract
Recent studies for primary and secondary education find positive effects of the share of
girls in the classroom on achievement of boys and girls. This study examines whether
these results can be extrapolated to post-secondary education. We conduct an experiment
in which the shares of girls in workgroups for first year students in economics and busi-
ness are manipulated and students are randomly assigned to these groups. Boys tend to
postpone their dropout decision when surrounded by more girls, and there is also a modest
reduction in early absenteeism. On the other hand, boys perform worse on courses with
high math content when assigned to a group with many girls. Overall, however, we fail to
find substantial gender peer effects on achievement. This in spite of the fact that students’
perceptions of the behavior of themselves and their peers are influenced by the share of
girls.
JEL-codes: I22; I28; D83
Keywords: Field experiment; Peer effects; University students
1 Introduction
While in general the literature on peer effects in education shows mixed results, the few
studies dealing with gender peer effects tend to agree that more girls in the classroom
improve test scores (Epple and Romano, 2010; Sacerdote, 2010).
Using data for 3-6 graders in Texas, Hoxby (2000) finds that a 10 percentage point
rise in the share of girls leads to an increase of around 4 percent of a standard devi-
ation in reading scores, and an increase of up to 8 percent of a standard deviation in
math scores. To identify these effects, she exploits variation in the share of girls in a
grade in a school across adjacent cohorts. Given the magnitude of the impact on math
scores, Hoxby argues that peers’ achievement is unlikely to be the only channel. Apply-
ing a similar approach to data from Israeli primary, middle and high schools, Lavy and
Schlosser (2010) also find large effects from the share of girls in the classroom, and they
also argue that these effects are reflecting more than only an increase in peers’ average
test scores. Lavy and Schlosser provide evidence indicating that the share of girls works
through lowering classroom disruption and violence and through improving inter-student
and student-teacher relationships. Black et al. (2010) apply the same method, now to 9th
graders in Norway and report positive point estimates of the impact of the share of girls
on math scores of boys and girls. These estimates are, however, not significantly different
from zero, probably due to the small variation in the share of girls across cohorts within
schools. Finally, Whitmore (2005) finds that pupils in kindergarten and second grade do
better if there is a majority of girls in the class. First graders are not affected by gender
peer effects, and third graders seem to be harmed when they are in a class with more than
50 percent girls.1
These previous studies deal with gender peer effects in primary and secondary schools.
At these education levels, the boys-girls ratio is fixed and virtually constant over time.
Only the existence of single-sex schools changes the expected boys-girls ratio at the level
of schools.2 This is different at the post-secondary level. The boys-girls ratio varies across
fields of study, and in recent decades the fraction of female students in higher education
increased considerably. This naturally leads to the question whether the increased partic-
1Whitmore exploits the variation in share of girls across classrooms induced by the random assignment
of pupils to large and small classes in the STAR-experiment. In her estimations, she controls for students’
own gender, free-lunch status, race, class size assignment and school fixed effects. As explanations for the
deviating result for third graders, Whitmore suggests a developmental change in children around this age
related to peer pressure, or girls-dominated classes progressing too rapidly for boys.
2One important question is then whether girls and boys that attend single-sex schools perform better than
girls and boys that attend mixed-sex schools. Moreover, since most single-sex schools are girls-schools,
the existence of such schools also affects the boys-girls ratio for other schools that draw from the same
population. It is then legitimate to ask whether the boys and girls that are left behind, suffer from the
presence of girls-schools.
1
ipation of girls in higher education has had an impact on achievement. Extrapolating the
findings for primary and secondary school pupils, one would expect that this development
raised academic performance. Such extrapolation ignores, however, that the interaction
between boys and girls as well as their relative achievement is very different at different
ages.
This paper reports about a randomized experiment that we conducted amongst first
year undergraduate students in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam.
The first year consists of fourteen compulsory courses. Students attend tutorial sessions
for all these courses in groups of around 40 students – so-called workgroups. During the
entire first year, students are assigned to the same workgroup. This implies that they share
around 9 of their 15 weekly teaching hours in this same group of students. We assume
that this is the relevant peer group. For two consecutive years (2007/8 and 2008/9), we
obtained permission to differentiate the share of girls across workgroups and to assign
boys and girls randomly to these groups. While the share of girls in the total population
is around 0.3, the share of girls in workgroups varies between 0.14 and 0.51. We examine
the impact of the share of girls on dropout, absenteeism, and number of credits collected
during various stages of the first year and for different types of courses.
By and large our results show very little evidence of gender peer effects of any relevant
size. There appears to be a tendency amongst male students to postpone their dropout
decision when they are surrounded by many girls in their workgroup. There is also a
modest reduction in absenteeism early in the year. On the other hand, boys in workgroups
with a high share of girls, do worse in courses with a high math content (mathematics
and statistics). In search for mechanisms, we find that students’ perceptions of their own
behavior and that of their peers is influenced by the share of girls. Students in groups with
many girls find their groupmates more helpful, but are also more afraid to ask questions,
and talk more often during class. This does, however, not affect their outcomes.
This paper sets – as Sacerdote (2010) phrases it – a next logical step in the literature
on peer effects in education by “the designing of experiments to see whether the peer
effects measured in observational data can be exploited by university administrators to
maximize GPA or some other objective.” It is the first paper that looks at gender peer
effects in university education.3 It is also the first study reporting about an experiment
that explicitly randomizes students into different gender peer groups. Related to this,
there is much more and wider variation in the share of girls in the data used in this study
than in the data used in other studies. The ratio in the share of girls between the high and
the low treatments is 3 (= 1/21/6). Such variation in treatment intensity will not occur very
3Hansen et al. (2006) look at the effect of group diversity in terms of gender, age and race in an un-
dergraduate management class. For a part of the class requirements students are assigned to four or five
member teams. The study focuses mainly on the impact of group composition on group performance.
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frequently in studies that use within grade-school variation in the share of girls in adjacent
cohorts.
The paper continues as follows. The next section gives more details on the context
and the data. Section 3 describes the design of the experiment. Section 4 presents and
discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 summarizes and discusses the implications
of our findings.
2 Context and data
2.1 Context
The bachelor program in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam has a
nominal duration of 3 years. Students meeting the admission requirements are automati-
cally accepted for the study without further selection.4 In the first academic year, which
runs from September until August, all students in economics and business follow exactly
the same program. In the years that the experiment was conducted, the first year program
was divided into four terms of 7 weeks each. Since the first year program is fixed, stu-
dents cannot substitute easy for difficult courses.5 Every term ended with exams shortly
after the courses finished and the re-take exams are organized later in the year. The first
academic year thus consists of 28 study weeks, which are allotted to different courses in
the form of 60 credit points. The total number of first year students in the economics and
business program is 593 in 2007/8 and 606 in 2008/9.
Teaching during the first year takes place in the form of central lectures for all first
year students together and in workgroup meetings for groups of at most 40 students.
In workgroup meetings students typically receive in depth explanation of the material,
ask questions, and practice and discuss exercises and assignments. The instructor of a
workgroup is in most cases a member of the permanent (junior) academic staff. Students
are assigned to a specific workgroup before the start of the year and are supposed to stay
in the same group for the entire first year. There were 14 workgroups in 2007/8 and also
14 in 2008/9.
The curriculum in the first year consists of fourteen compulsory courses. Table 1 lists
the courses together with their scheduling in the year and their study load in terms of total
teaching hours, workgroup hours and credit points. This table shows that most of total
teaching hours – slightly over 60% – takes place in workgroup meetings. We therefore
4The main requirement is that students graduated from the highest (pre-university) track in secondary
education.
5Only after the first term of their second academic year students choose different packages of courses to
specialize either in economics or in business.
3
Table 1. Overview of the first year courses in the economics and business program
Course Term Total teaching Workgroup Credit
hours hours points
Financial accounting 1 28 14 5
Organization 1 12 12 5
Orientation fiscal economics 1 6 0 2
Mathematics 1 1/2 56 28 5
Academic skills 1 1/2 28 28 2
Management accounting 2 28 14 4
Microeconomics 2 42 28 7
Organization and management 3 28 14 6
Statistics 3 42 14 5
Mathematics 2 3/4 56 28 4
Academic skills 2 3/4 28 28 3
Finance 4 21 21 5
Macroeconomics 4 42 28 7
Total 417 257 60
assume that the other students assigned to the same workgroup are a relevant peer group.6
2.2 Data
Our main data come from the student administration of the department of economics and
business of the University of Amsterdam.7 They contain students’ background character-
istics, their workgroup assignment and their study performance and study status during
the first year. The bottom part of Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of students’ back-
ground characteristics, in the last two lines for boys and girls separately.
Students enrolling in the economics and business program of the University of Am-
sterdam score GPA’s (overall and for math) somewhat below 7 (on a scale from 1-10).
Girls outperform boys with regards to the GPA’s in secondary school. The average age
at the moment of enrollment is 19 years and three months. Students who enroll without
any delay, would on average enter at the age of 18 years and six months, indicating that a
substantial share of the students enters with a delay of one year or more. Three quarters
of the enrolling students graduated from the economics/society specialization from sec-
ondary school, and another 18% followed the science/health specialization. With respect
6Defining the relevant peer group is not obvious. Some studies explore this issue by defining peer
groups at different levels. For example, Sacerdote (2001) examines peer effects of roommates as well as of
dormmates.
7We also collected additional data through a survey amongst students. We describe (and report about)
this data source in Subsection 4.5.
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to age and secondary school specialization, we observe no large differences between boys
and girls.
3 Design
For the experiment we manipulated the share of girls in first year workgroups and assigned
boys and girls randomly to these groups. The 2007/8-cohort consists of 33 percent girls,
the 2008/9-cohort of 30 percent. Beforehand we decided that one third of the workgroups
would contain few girls (around 16 ), one third of the groups would have an average share
of girls (around 13 ), and one third of the groups would have many girls (around
1
2 ).
Students can apply in the period between May and September for the academic year
that starts in September. Shortly after they apply and are accepted, students receive an
acceptance letter which among other things informs them about the workgroup to which
they are assigned. Because of this system of rolling acceptance, new applicants were
assigned to groups every week or every two weeks. In doing so, we kept the shares of
girls as close as possible to the predetermined shares. This implies that boys and girls
are stratified by week of application. As the week of application is probably related to
students’ motivation and is a strong predictor of their subsequent performance, this should
keep average motivation/ability of boys and girls assigned to different groups the same.
Students who took the more advanced (instead of the standard) mathematics track in
secondary education are assigned to separate workgroups. In each year there were only
two of such workgroups. The shares of girls in these groups were manipulated as well and
were 0.30 and 0.41 in 2007/8 and 0.14 and 0.38 in 2008/9. Dropping these four groups
from our analyses does not change our results. Very late appliers were placed into extra
separate groups where the share of girls was not manipulated. These groups are removed
from all our analyses.8
To examine whether girls and boys that are assigned to groups with different shares
of girls are indeed not systematically different, we regressed a set of observable student
characteristics on the share of girls in their group. We thereby control for the students’
own sex and a dummy for the group consisting of students with an advanced math back-
ground. As the top part of Table 2 shows, the share of girls in workgroups does not
systematically co-vary with application date (as a proxy for students’ motivation), nor
with performance or track choice in pre-university education, nor with age. We conclude
that our randomization scheme worked properly.
Although boys (girls) who are assigned to groups with many girls are not different
from boys (girls) who are assigned to groups with few girls, the student characteristics
8This explains why the mean of the percentile rank in Table 2 is lower than 50.
6
in groups with many girls will still be different from the student characteristics in groups
with few girls if the characteristics of boys and girls are different. This is unavoidable
unless we assign other boys (girls) to groups with many girls than to groups with few
girls. This implies that the gender peer effects that we estimate are gross effects; they
also include the effect of girls being different in other characteristics than boys than just
in their gender. This issue is not specific to the randomized design used in this study,
it arises in all other gender peer studies as well. To see to what extent a larger share of
girls comes together with other peer characteristics, we calculated correlations between
the share of girls in a group and the group averages of the characteristics listed in the
top row of Table 2, thereby conditioning on being placed in an advanced math group.
Two correlations are substantial and significantly different from zero. The conditional
correlation between the share of girls and group-average GPA equals 0.39 (s.e. 0.18) and
the conditional correlation between the share of girls and group-average math grade in
secondary school equals 0.68 (s.e. 0.26). This implies that part of the gender peer effects
that we report in this paper may operate through (an interaction with) ability peer effects.
Figure 1 shows the actual distributions of shares of girls across workgroups by year.
Eight hundred students (exactly 400 per cohort) were randomly assigned to 22 work-
groups (11 per year). The share of girls ranged from 0.14 to 0.51. Deviations from the
intended ratios occurred because some students who signed up for the study never showed
up, because of slight deviations in the actual shares of girls from the expected share of
one third, and because of the lower share of girls with an advanced math preparation.
Compliance to workgroup assignment is high: according to the attendance lists of the
first course of the 2008/9 cohort, all students attended their assigned group. Of the stu-
dents in this cohort who had not dropped out by February, only four percent had formally
changed group by the second semester. We do know that in some courses informal group
changes occurred, but these were infrequent. Dropouts (who are disproportionally often
males) change the gender composition slightly. The correlation between the share of girls
in the group that started the year and the share of girls in the group that still studies,
however, never drops below 0.90.
4 Results
We regress individual students’ study outcomes on the share of girls in their workgroup,
controlling for their own sex and a dummy indicating Math B groups. To gain precision,
we control for cohort, application order, age at the start of the academic year, specializa-
tion in secondary school, GPA in secondary school and math grade and level in secondary
school. GPA, math grades and age are set to zero when missing and dummies are included
7
Note: Each dot represents one tutorial group. A triangle represents two groups and a square represents three
groups.
Figure 1. Tutorial groups and their share of females
for missing data. To accommodate the clustered nature of the data, we calculate cluster-
robust standard errors. As the number of clusters is fairly small, we test using critical
values drawn from a t-distribution where degrees of freedom equals the number of groups
minus two (Cameron et al., 2008).9
4.1 Dropouts
The academic year is divided into four periods. The bottom part of Table 3 shows that
9.4% of the students dropped out after the exams of period 1. If a student deregisters
from the study before February, the tuition fee is reimbursed; 15.1% of students decide
to drop out before this date, which coincides with the end of the second period. By
the end of period 3, the dropout rate has risen to 25.4%. Like most university faculties
in The Netherlands, the University of Amsterdam’s economics and business department
does not select students before enrolling (as long as the student completed pre-university
education, or obtained an equivalent qualification). Instead, selection takes place mainly
throughout the first year of the study, by setting the strict requirement that students have
to obtain at least 35 credits (out of 60) and pass the Mathematics 1 exam. This explains
9In most analyses, we have 22 groups and thus test at critical values of 2.85, 2.09 and 1.73 for the 1%,
5% and 10% significance level, respectively. To ensure that this method is sufficiently conservative, we
compare the standard errors with Bias Reduced Linearization (BRL) standard errors (Bell and McCaffrey,
2002). Appendix Table A1 shows some of our main results next to those obtained using BRL. BRL standard
errors are somewhat smaller, but we test at higher critical t-values, so that both methods yield equivalent
results.
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the high dropout rates: 42.4% of students do not start in the second academic year. These
dropout rates after each period are significantly higher for boys than for girls.10
The top part of Table 3 shows the effects of the share of girls in workgroups on the
probability of dropping out. The first row shows results from regressions in which only
own sex and group type are included as controls. The regressions presented in the second
row are based on a specification with the full set of controls. The lower panel shows
results from similar regressions, in which the share of girls is now also interacted with
a dummy which is equal to one of the student is a girl.11 By February of the first study
year, the share of dropouts is substantially lower in workgroups with a higher proportion
girls. Increasing the share of girls by 10 percentage points decreases the dropout rate
by 1.8 percentage point. This effect seems mainly to be driven by males, although the
interaction effect is estimated quite imprecisely. The effect on dropping out disappears
towards the end of the year. It seems that a higher share of girls leads (male) students to
postpone their dropout decision, but does not prevent them from dropping out in the end.
4.2 Absenteeism
Workgroup attendance is not centrally registered. We collected absenteeism data for the
first practical in 2008/9. In this particular course (and only here), workgroups were ran-
domly split into two halves, in which the original share of females was kept as constant
as possible. Absenteeism data were available for 13 of the 22 subgroups. These 13 sub-
groups come from 10 workgroups. The academic skills practical consisted of seven ses-
sions, of which students were allowed to miss at most two. As the final column in Table 3
shows, increasing the share of girls is associated with a sizable reduction in absenteeism.
This impact tends to be larger for girls than for boys, but the difference is not significant.
4.3 Credits
As measure of students’ performance, we look at the number of credits that students
collect during various stages of the first year.12 During the first study year, students can
obtain a maximum of 60 credits. On average students obtained slightly more than half of
this. Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4 report effects on credits obtained per period. The four
10The respective p-values are 0.014, 0.007, 0.000 and 0.000.
11In this specification, the coefficient of “share girls” gives the impact on boys while the sum of the
coefficients of “share girls” and “student is girl × share girls” is the impact on girls.
12An alternative measure of students’ performance is their GPA in the first year of their study. This
measure is difficult to interpret though, since it is based only on exams that students actually took. Many
students skip certain exams, and dropouts do not take exams that fell later in the year. This distorts GPA in
a direction that depends on the difficulty of the exams that were not taken. How this would exactly affect
the estimates is hard to gauge. We estimated regressions similar to those reported in Table 4 with GPA as
dependent variable; none of the estimates for share of girls differs significantly from zero.
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periods differ slightly in length and correspondingly in the number of attainable credits.
Table 4 has the same structure as Table 3.
Early in the year (after period 1), a higher share of girls in workgroups has a positive
impact on the number credits. This effect is the same for boys and girls. This effect
disappears, however, already in the second period. For the second, third and fourth period,
we find no significant impact of the share of girls on the number of credits students obtain.
Also for the total number of credits at the end of the first year, we see no impact (see
column (5)).
In columns (7) and (9), courses are split up into courses with a high math content
(mathematics and statistics courses) and all other courses which contain fewer math com-
ponents. We find that boys (but not girls) obtain a lower number of math-related credits
when the share of girls in their workgroup is higher. This effect is not present for non-
math-related courses. Perhaps, as the share of girls increases, instruction in math-related
courses becomes geared more to girls. If so, this does not seem to benefit girls, but only
to harm boys.
Our estimates on the numbers of credits may have been pushed upwards by students
who postponed their dropout decision by a few months as a result of a higher share of girls,
and in the meantime managed to obtain a few more credit points. Given that the estimated
effect on dropping out after a year is practically zero, one may be more interested in the
peer effect on those people who continued studying, as dropouts would have dropped out
anyway, irrespective of the share of girls in their workgroup, and effects on the number of
credits they obtained before dropping out seem less relevant. Columns (6), (8) and (10)
are based on the restricted sample of students who are still taking exams in the next year.
Results remain very similar to the results based on all observations, but the effects for
math-related courses become more pronounced: boys obtained fewer math credits if they
were assigned to workgroups where the share of girls was higher, but for girls, the share
of girls made no difference.
4.4 Heterogeneous effects by ability
Peer effects need not be homogeneous. Above we already considered the possibility of
heterogeneous effects by allowing for the possibility that the share of girls in a workgroup
affects boys and girls differently. We therefore interacted the share of girls with own sex.
Another characteristic that is often included in interaction with peer composition is own
ability.
Table 5 reports regressions that test whether gender peer effects vary with own ability
level. In the upper panel, interactions are added between the share of girls and a dummy
indicating whether the student is in the top-25% highest ability. The ability measure is
11
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Table 5. Heterogeneous effect estimates by ability
Dropout Absen- Credits Credits Credits
end of year teeism Math Other courses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full set of controls
Share girls × 25% highest ability -0.18 1.61 -2.41 -3.09 0.68
(0.26) (1.47) (9.61) (2.11) (8.09)
Share girls 0.02 -1.29** 4.70 -0.77 5.47
(0.12) (0.46) (4.57) (1.06) (3.69)
Full set of controls
Share girls× 50% highest ability 0.08 0.32 -0.36 -0.73 0.36
(0.25) (0.90) (10.59) (1.97) (9.02)
Share girls -0.05 -1.13*** 4.31 -1.11 5.42
(0.18) (0.33) (6.37) (1.51) (5.09)
N 800 242 800 800 800
Scale 0-1 0-1 60 0-14 0-46
Mean 0.424 0.74 33.6 5.35 28.29
(SD) 0.494 1.12 (19.6) (5.10) (15.43)
Mean - girls 0.273 0.83 40.9 7.75 33.19
Mean - boys 0.492 0.70 30.3 4.26 26.08
Note: Coefficients refer to an increase of the female share from 0% to 100%. Critical values for testing
are 2.85, 2.09 and 1.73 for the 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent significance level, respectively. The
upper (lower) panel reports regressions that include the full set of controls from our previous analyses, but
additionally add the interaction between share of girls in tutorial group and a dummy indicating whether
students belonged to the highest 24.8 (50.6) percent in the university preparatory education GPA-ranking.
based on GPA in secondary education.13 We find that effects are neither consistently
stronger, nor weaker on the most able students than on other students. For the bottom
panel of Table 5, students are split into two halves based on their ability. The interaction
effects again do not point to any systematic differences in gender peer effects between
students from different parts of the ability distribution. We conclude that the gender peer
effect is not heterogeneous across students’ own ability level.
We also tested for non-linear effects by adding the square of the share of girls to the
regression equation. We found no evidence for non-linearities: none of the quadratic
effects gets close to significance.
4.5 Exploring the causes of gender peer effects
At the end of both academic years, we carried out a survey among the students in our
experiment. The purpose was to gain further insight into how gender peer effects may
13If this GPA was unknown (virtually always because the student did not take pre-university education,
but entered the study via another route, such as via a lower-level bachelor), s/he was placed into the lowest
half of the ability distribution.
13
arise as a result of peer group related changes in students’ behavior. In total, 307 students
filled out the questionnaire; response rates were 36 percent in 2007/8 and 41 in 2008/9.
Due to the timing of the survey, dropouts are underrepresented in the response: 6 percent
of the respondents dropped out after period 3, compared to 25 percent of all students. 39
percent of the respondents are female, which is somewhat higher than the share of girls
in the population of 31 percent. Due to the non-response, we have to interpret the results
from the questionnaire with some caution.
Traditionally, explanations for peer effects have mainly been sought in classroom dis-
ruptions, adaptations of teaching styles to the students in the class, social comparisons,
and excellent students providing good examples for others (Lazear, 2001; Hoxby and
Weingarth, 2005; Van Ewijk and Sleegers, 2010). ?, for example, find that the presence
of more boys is disruptive, leads to a deteriorated learning environment, and induces
teachers to adapt their teaching styles. Most research on peer effects, however, and espe-
cially research on gender peer effects, focused on school children. In-class behavior in
university is likely to be different, and boys may not be as disruptive in workgroups in
university as they are in class at younger ages. The different interaction between boys and
girls at this age may lead to different sorts of gender peer effects.
Columns (1) to (5) of Table 6 show effects on the ratings students gave of their peers
and workgroup. Columns (6) to (11) refer to ratings students gave of their own behavior.
Regression equations are the same as in previous models, with the addition of a control
for parental education.14 Most questions are answered on 5-point scales, with answer
categories ranging from not/never (1) to very often (5). Atmosphere in the workgroup is
measured on a 10-point scale.
We find that students are neither distracted less often, nor do they pay more attention
or rate the atmosphere as better as the share of girls increases. Students in groups with
more girls also do not report their peers to pay less attention (column (3)). We conclude
that the traditional explanation for gender peer effects of disruptions by boys does not
apply to university students.
Other potential channels for gender peer effects are competitiveness and helpfulness
of students. Students do not report themselves to be more inclined to help others when the
share of girls in a workgroup increases, but do report an increase in average helpfulness
among their peers. This is probably not a peer effect, but simply a consequence of girls
on average being more helpful than boys. Students neither report changes in their own,
nor in their peers’ competitiveness, when the share of girls changes (columns (4) and (7)).
More than in primary and secondary school, studying together outside of class can
be an aspect of studying at university. About half of all students do sometimes study
14Leaving out the parental education control does not alter results.
14
together with fellow economics students. This share decreases for boys when the share
of girls increases, even though in each workgroup, there were enough other males they
could study with (if they would only want to study with another boy): the share of girls
is at most 0.51. We also find that as the share of girls increases, boys (but again not girls)
talk more in class about non-study related topics, and more often refrain from asking
questions in class because they are afraid to look dumb. Perhaps the boys want to make a
good impression on the girls, and talk more with the girls, or more likely (since the girls
themselves do not report talking more often in class), talk about the girls.
5 Summary and discussion
In this paper we examine gender peer effects by means of an experiment in which the
share of girls in workgroups attended by first year university students in economics and
business was manipulated and students were randomly assigned to these groups. We find
little evidence of gender peer effects of a relevant size.
Some students in this male-dominated study (69% of the students in our sample are
male) postpone their dropout decision when the share of girls among their peers is higher.
But this does not lead them to more study success, as at the end of the year, no effect on
dropout ratios remains. Early in the year, we find that absenteeism is reduced for students
in workgroups with many girls. It is also at the beginning of the year that gender peer
effects induce students to pass more courses. This effect disappears during the year. The
effect on the total number of credit points is insignificant and small, especially when tak-
ing into account that our original estimate on the number of credits obtained was pushed
upward by students who postponed their dropout decision and managed to pass some
additional courses before finally dropping out.
We find one exception for our general conclusion that gender peer effects are at most
small in size. Boys, but not girls, perform poorer in courses with a high math component if
the share of girls in their workgroup increases. Past researchers have tried to separate gen-
der peer effects from ability peer effects (Hoxby, 2000). Girls in our sample outperform
boys in math, but at the same time give rise to peer effects that suppress boys’ perfor-
mance. As the ability peer effect of having more able peers is unlikely to be negative, we
can interpret this as a true gender peer effect on math performance.15
Our results stand in contrast to some of the results reported in previous studies. Hoxby
(2000) and ? find that as the share of boys in classes increased, school performance
declined. The effect sizes they find using very large samples are, however, modest in size.
15In the “invidious comparison” model, outcomes are harmed by the presence of higher achieving peers
(cf. Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005). According to Sacerdote (2010) this model is certainly possible from a
theoretical point of view but may be less important from an empirical perspective.
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A key difference between this previous research and ours is that we focus on university
students, whereas their main focus is on younger children. Interactions between boys and
girls are different for different age groups.
Using a survey, we took a closer look at what happens in class as the share of girls
changes. Unlike at younger ages, among university students, the presence of more boys
does not work disruptively in a traditional sense, and does not lead students to pay less
attention. Some peer effects, however, may result from girls being more helpful. But per-
haps more importantly, boys change some behaviors when there are more girls present.
They talk more in class about non-study related topics, and more often refrain from asking
questions because they fear it might make them look dumb. The specifics of the interac-
tions between boys and girls at this age may also explain the postponement of dropout
decisions that we found: perhaps some boys just stay on longer because of the girls, but
if they are weak, they drop out in the end anyway.
Since girls on average have a higher ability (as measured by their GPA in secondary
school) and better study performance (as measured by their credits) than boys, the rising
share of girls amongst first year students in the economics and business program at the
University of Amsterdam (and probably elsewhere) has boosted the average quality of
the student inflow. Our results suggest that – contrary to what one would expect on the
basis of findings of gender peer effects in primary and secondary education – this inflow
of better students did not spill over to the performance of other students.
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